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HUMEANISM AND EXCEPTIONS IN THE FUNDAMENTAL LAWS
OF PHYSICS
BILLY WHEELER
Abstract. It has been argued that the fundamental laws of physics do not face a ‘problem of
provisos’ equivalent to that found in other scientific disciplines (Earman, Roberts and Smith
2002) and there is only the appearance of exceptions to physical laws if they are confused
with differential equations of evolution type (Smith 2002). In this paper I argue that even
if this is true, fundamental laws in physics still pose a major challenge to standard Humean
approaches to lawhood, as they are not in any obvious sense about regularities in behaviour.
A Humean approach to physical laws with exceptions is possible, however, if we adopt a view
of laws that takes them to be the algorithms in the algorithmic compressions of empirical data.
When this is supplemented with a distinction between lossy and lossless compression, we can
explain exceptions in terms of compression artefacts present in the application of the lossy
laws.
Keywords: Laws of nature; ceteris paribus laws; idealization; best system account; data
compression; algorithms; Humeanism; scientific fictions.
1. Introduction
It is no recent observation that scientific laws appear to have ‘exceptions’ if taken as
literal descriptions of the behaviour of objects. When Galileo introduced his famous
‘law of the pendulum’ viz., that the time taken to perform a complete oscillation de-
pends only on the strength for gravity and length of the pendulum, he remarked ‘I grant
that these conclusions proved in the abstract will be different when applied in the
concrete and will be fallacious to this extent’ (1638, p.251). The explanation he gave
is familiar: all actual pendulums will be subject to certain ‘impediments’ (such as
slack in the pendulum cord and friction around the pivot-point) and because of this
any calculations derived from the law will fail to match the pendulummotion exactly.
Despite these discrepancies scientists do not usually think these kinds of cases count
as falsification of the law. Instead, it is said that the law is a ‘ceteris paribus’ law, and
provided the practitioner is aware that a target system will — in all probability — be
subject to impediments, then the law can still be used successfully for prediction and
explanation.
Whilst these kinds of exceptions have not traditionally been problematic for sci-
entists, things have been different for philosophers of science. A long-lasting intuition
about laws of nature is that they should be universally true. A problem then emerges
concerning how to interpret laws with exceptions — for according to our pre-analytic
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intuitions — they should not exist. One natural suggestion is to suppose that the
problem only emerges for examples like Galileo’s because here the law is given in
a ‘short-hand’ form. Instead, a full statement of the law should include provisos to
exclude all impediments and when this is achieved the finished law will be true and
exceptionless. Unfortunately, this proposal has given rise to a famous problem known
as ‘Lange’s Dilemma’. Consider the example:
(A1) Taking aspirin daily reduces the risk of heart attack.
We know that this ‘law’ has exceptions. If a person takes aspirin daily and con-
sumes twice as many calories as they ought to, then their chance of suffering from a
heart attack will increase rather than reduce. To avoid this we could try hedging (A1)
likewise:
(A2) Provided the individual consumes no more calories than their recommended
daily allowance and provided they take regular exercise and provided they do
not have a genetic predisposition toward obesity and, . . . so on and so forth . . . ,
then taking aspirin daily will reduce their risk of heart attack.
The inclusion of the ‘. . . so on and so forth . . . ’ signifies that there are many po-
tential impediments and the worry is whether this gap could ever be filled in. Marc
Lange believes that we ought to be pessimistic. The number of possible impediments
is too vast, he argues, and ‘the only way to utter a complete law-statement is to em-
ploy some such condition as “. . . in the absence of relevant factors”’ (1993, p.235).
In other words, an exceptionless version of (A1) should read:
(A3) All else being equal, taking aspirin daily reduces the risk of heart attack.
This leaves us with a doubt concerning the semantic work being carried out by
the ‘all else being equal’ proviso. A natural worry is that if ‘all else being equal’ means
‘unless otherwise’, then (A3) will be logically true and not something that could be
supported or disproved by empirical evidence. The problem exceptions pose is to
find a way out of Lange’s Dilemma — to find a reading of (A3) that is neither false,
meaningless or a tautology.
To date philosophers have attempted to solve Lange’s Dilemma by either giving a
semantic or a metaphysical solution. Up until now semantic solutions have been the
most common. These involve formulating appropriate truth conditions for the ‘all else
being equal’ proviso so that it is does not become synonymous with the troublesome
‘unless otherwise’ proviso. The accounts given by Jerry Fodor (1991), Daniel Haus-
man (1992), Pietroski and Rey (1995) and Alan Silverberg (1996), can all be seen as
contributions to this effort, and there is still a lively ongoing debate concerning what
the right truth conditions for such provisos ought to be.1
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Metaphysical solutions are different from semantic solutions in that they allow
for the possibility of genuine laws of nature with genuine exceptions. This undercuts
Lange’s Dilemma, as it implies that these laws don’t need to be hedged after all, and
so we can stop worrying about how the proviso ought to be interpreted. Metaphysical
solutions have been less pursued: probably because they run counter to the intuition
that laws are universal and exceptionless. One of the earliest writers to provide a
metaphysical solution was Nancy Cartwright (1989). According to her ’the laws of
electromagnetic repulsion and attraction, like the law of gravity, and a host of other
laws as well, are laws about enduring tendencies or capacities’ (1989, p.1, my empha-
sis). Cartwright’s solution works because it depends on the existence of powers —
a kind of irreducible dispositional property that objects can have which may or may
not manifest depending on the circumstances.
Cartwright’s solution to the problem of exceptions has proven popular and vari-
ations of her account have been defended by Stephen Mumford (1998) and Andreas
Hüttemann (2007; 2014). This approach to the metaphysics of laws is anti-Humean
in that it allows for the existence of more than just occurrent behaviour in the world.
It therefore sets a challenge to those sympathetic to Humeanism to explain laws with
exceptions. Only very recently has that challenge begun to bemet, mainly through the
work of David Braddon-Mitchell (2001), Markus Schrenk (2007; 2014) and Jonathan
Cohen and Craig Callender (2009; 2010).
In this paper I evaluate to what extent a Humean metaphysical solution to the
problem of exceptions in fundamental physical laws is possible. I start in section 2 by
looking at the regularity view and what many take to be its most defensible variant
— the Best System Account (BSA). It turns out that at least two different kinds of
exception-ridden laws exist in science and in section 3 I make a distinction between
ceteris paribus laws and ideal laws. I consider both Schrenk’s and Braddon-Mitchell’s
variations on the BSA and argue that Braddon-Mitchell’s is the more superior. How-
ever, Braddon-Mitchell’s explanation in terms of ‘lossy compression’ can only work
when the BSA is abandoned in favour of an alternative theory that takes laws to be
algorithms for compressing empirical data. This theory is outlined and explained in
section 4 and finally in section 5 it is applied to the most problematic laws in physics
— those that have not positive instances at all.
2. The Best System Account
The BSA has its origins in the writings of John Stuart Mill (1895) and Frank Ramsey
(1990), but it is with David Lewis (1973; 1980; 1986) that we find its most canonical
formulation. According to Lewis a law is a general statement that fits in an appro-
priate way with other statements to form an axiomatic system of empirical truths.
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Deductive systems can be more or less simple and more or less informative depend-
ing on the number, length and content of the axioms. According to Lewis, science
values simplicity and informativeness in equal measure so that the ‘best system’ is
the one that strikes as good a balance between them as truth will allow. Lewis be-
lieves that it is reasonable to suppose that the laws of nature (as opposed to what
scientists currently take the laws to be) correspond to the axioms in the system that
systematises all empirical truths about our universe whilst best balancing simplicity
and informativeness.2
It is clear fromwhat Lewis says that he thinks the axioms of the best systemwill be
universally true: ‘whatever else a law may be, it is at least an exceptionless regularity’
(1986, p.45). So it does not appear at first glance that there is any room for including
exception-ridden generalisations within the BSA. Despite this, Schrenk (2007; 2014)
believes Lewis’ original theory can tolerate exceptions. To achieve this he utilises
Lewis’ theory of counterfactuals. The truth of a counterfactual is judged, according
to Lewis, by the proximity of the counterfactual world to the actual world. Proximity
of worlds can bemeasured by a number of different criteria, but are frequently judged
on the basis of the laws they share. Schrenk appeals to a remark from Lewis which
appears to support the allowance of some small violations of law:
A localized violation is not the most serious sort of difference of law. The
violated deterministic law has presumably not been replaced by a contrary
law. Indeed, a version of the violated law, complicated and weakened by a
clause to permit one exception, may still be simple and strong enough to
survive as a law. (1973, p.75)
For Lewis, this means that counterfactual statements that involve just one differ-
ence to the actual world could be judged to be true (using our laws of nature) as the
difference between that world and ours is only very small (our hedged law would
still be a law even at the counterfactual world). For Schrenk, this means that the
axioms in the best system in the nearby world can tolerate some isolated violations.
Now assuming that what is good for that world is good for our own means that we
can expect exceptions to laws at our world too. Where there is a singular exception,
it is plausible that a statement hedged to exclude it could still turn out to be part of
the best system vis-a-vis overall strength and simplicity, since the additional proviso
ought not to complicate our system too much.
What would such a generalisation look like? Schrenk calls these hedged gener-
alisations ‘index laws’ (2007 p.76) and they contain a clause to exclude a particular
space-time region from the law. Hence if ‘Fs are Gs’ has an exception at the space-time
region (x , y, z, t) then we can add the following axiom:
(Index Law) ∀u(Fu & not−@(x , y, z, t) ⊃ Gu)
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The first thing to note about Schrenk’s index laws is that they are not ceteris
paribus laws. The proviso ‘not−@(x , y, z, t)’ is an unambiguous material condition
and as such does not give rise to Lange’s Dilemma. The second thing to note is that
index laws do not really have exceptions, as these are excluded by the space-time
region clause. It is questionable, therefore, whether Schrenk’s account really suffices
as a metaphysical solution since if this is the full version of the law then it is excep-
tionless after all!
There are, however, more serious concerns about Schrenk’s proposal. Schrenk
acknowledges that this explanation can only work when the number of exceptions
to the law is exceedingly small. If the violation is ‘temporally and spatially very lim-
ited’ (2007, p.78) then it seems reasonable that an index law could make it into the
best system. But if the number of exceptions is large (in comparison to the overall
number of positive instances) then the resulting statement will be too complicated
to outweigh its lack of strength. This is an important problem for Schrenk’s account,
for it looks like most of the cases in science philosophers are concerned with can be
expected to have more than one exception. Even the aspirin law from above suffices
to demonstrate this. ‘Taking aspirin daily reduces the risk of heart attack’ will no
doubt have many exceptions over the total course of the universe’s history. Galileo’s
law of the pendulum fairs even worse. This law does not just have exceptions in
some instances — it has exceptions in all instances — because no real-world physical
pendulum can ever be exempt from air-resistance, slack and pivot-point friction.
Schrenk attempts to explain cases where there are many exceptions by saying that
in these worlds the best system would contain few — if any — axioms (2007, p.79).
In other words, our intuitions would be to judge these worlds as lawless. But this does
not square well with science as it is actually practiced — which seems quite happy to
honour a generalisation the title ‘law’ even though it contains many exceptions.
Schrenk would not agree in calling the above examples ‘exceptions’. He makes a
distinction between ‘apparent exceptions’ and ‘real exceptions’:
A law might have an apparent exception (or falsification) because its conse-
quent property is, while fully instantiated, counteracted or diluted by other
events. Think of a multitude of forces (gravitational forces, electromagnetic
forces, etc.) all acting upon a single body, an electron, for example. The law
of gravitation alone will seem to have an exception if the other forces are
disregarded in a prediction of the electron’s trajectory. Quite a different case
would be the following: God decides to switch off, for a second or two, the
gravitational force attracting the electron. This, as opposed to the first case,
would be an example where we could justifiably claim that there is a real
exception to the law. (2007, p.25, my emphasis)
For Schrenk only if a generalisation has an exception that cannot be explained in
the normal course of events should we consider it a real exception and as such only
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those sorts of cases are the proper target for his account. Yet the distinction he makes
between apparent and real exceptions is problematic for two reasons.
Firstly, this is not a distinction everyone can help themselves to— for whether one
allows the existence of counteracting forces will depend very much on one’s meta-
physics. Component forces are poorly understood by Humeans and the traditional
tactic has been to analyse them in terms of potential behaviour. It is doubtful, there-
fore, whether their existence can do the work Schrenk requires of them without also
accepting the existence of something like hidden powers or capacities. As a result we
cannot make this distinction without abandoning Humeanism.
Secondly, even if we could make a legitimate distinction in this way, it is not
entirely clear how illuminating the emerging theory of laws would be. The sort of
cases that Schrenk calls ‘real exceptions’ are more akin to miracles and not the sort
of things scientists deal with on a day-to-day basis. Schrenk does suggest that his ‘real
exceptions’ might occur at the centre of black holes, but even he acknowledges this is
controversial due to our lack of understanding of black holes and the fact that the laws
themselves seem to predict their own failure under these conditions (2007, pp.54–
61). Robert Kowalenko makes a similar complaint: ‘The reader may be forgiven for
asking what, under these circumstances, Schrenk’s ‘laws’ have to do with the sorts
of laws scientists normally talk about’ (2011, p.451). Whilst Schrenk’s version of the
BSA may be able to cope with the metaphysics of extremely speculative cases, it does
little to help the Humean respond to Lange’s Dilemma which is concerned, for the
most part, with the laws scientists normally ‘talk about’.
In a more recent paper (Schrenk 2014) he does attempt to address these concerns
by developing a version that incorporates examples of laws found in the special sci-
ences. He provides what he calls a ‘Better Best System Account’ (BBSA). This differs
from the BSA in two ways: (i) each individual branch of science, e.g. chemistry, bi-
ology, economics etc., is allowed to have its own best system using terms for kind
distinctions that may not be shared by other sciences3 (2007, pp.7–9), and (ii) indi-
vidual exceptions to the laws are not referred to via indices but to space-time regions
that are explicitly named (2007, pp.12–13). It is the second part of Schrenk’s BBSA
which he hopes can account for exceptions to traditional examples of laws.
The solution is not too dissimilar from his (2007) account in that the clause
should be eliminated with material conditions — the only difference being that this
time the exceptions are ruled out by explicitly naming them:
(BBSA) ∀u(Fu & not− (u= a1) & not− (u= a2) & . . . not− (u= a3) ⊃ Gu)
In terms of its effectiveness of accounting for real-life scientific laws with excep-
tions I do not see how the BBSA fares any better than Schrenk’s original BSA. Recall
that the reason why we feel compelled to add a ceteris paribus clause is because
most exceptions to laws are unknown and an exhaustive list of them lies beyond our
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abilities. Schrenk is not worried by this concern and claims that ignorance of the
conditions does not rule out these laws existing in the best system in principle —
their ‘un-namability’ is only a problem for epistemology and not metaphysics (2014,
p.21). But there does remain a metaphysical worry. Schrenk’s move from excluding
to explicitly naming exceptions does nothing to account for the lawhood of gener-
alisations that fail to have any positive instances, such as the law of the pendulum.
For such a law to be an axiom, all instances of harmonic motion would need to be
named. Since this saving strategy is possible for any false empirical generalisation
we might come up with, it conflates the law/accident distinction. Schrenk’s versions
of the BSA and BBSA therefore fail to deliver an acceptable Humean solution to the
problem of laws with exceptions.
3. Ideal Laws and Ceteris Paribus Laws
It is a common assumption in the debate about exceptions to laws that they can be
found in most — if not all — scientific disciplines, and that their occurrence comes
about in much the same way. It is the special sciences (e.g. biology, sociology, psychol-
ogy, economics, etc.,) where the existence of exceptions is perhaps most obvious, and
it is here where the contemporary debate about interpreting ceteris paribus provisos
began (Fodor, 1991). It could be argued that the following is a law of psychology:
(P1) If S desires X , then S will take steps to achieve X .
It should be obvious that (P1) will have exceptions. S will not always take steps
to achieve X , especially if there are conflicting or overriding desires to do something
that precludes X .
Cartwright (1983) can be credited for bringing attention to the fact that the most
basic laws of physics also have exceptions. Controversially, she argued that these
exceptions are no different in kind to those found in other sciences (1989; 1999).
She illustrates her point using Newton’s law of universal gravitation:
Does this law truly describe how bodies behave? Assuredly not . . . it is not
true that for any two bodies the force between them is given by the law of
gravitation. Some bodies are charged bodies, and the force between them is
not Gmm′/r2. Rather it is some resultant of this force . . . For bodies which are
both massive and charged, the law of universal gravitation and Coulomb’s
law (the law that gives the force between two charges) interact to determine
the final force. But neither law by itself truly describes how the bodies be-
have. No charged objects will behave just as the law of universal gravitation
says; and any massive objects will constitute a counterexample to Coulomb’s
law. (1983, p.57)
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According to Cartwright, the laws of physics are not fundamentally different from
generalisations such as ‘aspirins relieve headaches’ in that, taken as a description of
behaviour, they are strictly-speaking false. For her, both sorts of law have exceptions
and they do so for the same reason: one or more interacting capacities blocks the
expected behaviour. The Humean of course cannot appeal to capacities and so seems
forced to acknowledge that the fundamental laws of physics are not about regularities
in behaviour and therefore not candidates for genuine lawhood.
Cartwright’s assumption that exceptions to physical laws are ultimately the same
type as those found in other sciences seems to me a mistake. In this section I present
reasons for arguing that we are dealing with at least two different kinds of exception-
ridden laws in the sciences.
Let us go back to Cartwright’s example ‘aspirins relieve headaches’. As an every-
day rule-of-thumb this law is useful in that on some occasions taking an aspirin really
does relieve a headache. However, we also know that taken as a universal general-
isation this statement is false, i.e. there are some occasions when taking an aspirin
does not relieve a headache. It is also unlikely that we could ever hedge this law
with enough conditions to save it from falsity. We are forced to add a general ceteris
paribus proviso that invokes the spectre of Lange’s Dilemma. Because of this, it is
also unlikely that the law is completely reliable when predicting whether or not an
aspirin will relieve a headache on a given occasion. As we do not know all the cir-
cumstances that prevent it from working, we can never tell whether these have all
been eliminated or not in a particular instance.
If we compare the foregoing points with the laws from physics we see that things
are different. Firstly, physical laws which have exceptions can never be used to make
perfectly accurate predictions unless by chance. Returning to Galileo’s law of the pen-
dulum, this law cannot be expected to correctly describe the motion of a real-world
pendulum since it assumes — among other things — that the bob is a point mass and
that the pendulum is swung from a frictionless pivot-conditions that cannot be phys-
ically realised. Of course we might try to approximate these conditions (and this is
an important part of experiment design), but we could never instantiate them fully.
Hence the law will be systematically false in all real-world cases. Secondly, unlike
the aspirin example, there are many physical laws which have known ‘idealization
conditions’ which if placed as a limit on the scope of the law could be used to save it
from falsity. A third difference is that physical laws are ‘piecemeal improvable’. Leszek
Nowak (1980) has called this method ‘concretization’ as it involves further variables
and mathematical operations being added to our equation in order to accommodate
the additional lines of influence. An example of this can be seen among the gas laws.
These laws tell us how the pressure and temperature of a gas are related. They get
progressively more complicated as their accuracy improves by incorporating further
factors (e.g. going from Boyle’s law to the Ideal Gas law to van der Waals equation).
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Finally, as a result of knowing the idealization conditions physicists can predict the
cases when the law will fail. Ronald Laymon (1989) takes this to be an important
part of the confirmation process of idealized claims and explains how they can be
tested by scientists despite never being fully realised in nature.
This suggests we are dealing with two different types of exception-ridden laws in
the sciences — with one group mostly proliferating in the special sciences — and the
other group-the physical sciences. Let us stick with tradition and call the first group
ceteris paribus laws, since they are the ones that need a ‘ceteris paribus proviso’ to be
saved from falsity. For reasons that will become clear, let us call the second group of
exception-ridden laws — the ones mostly found in physics — ideal laws. The main
differences between these laws can be summarised in the following table:
Ceteris Paribus Laws Ideal Laws
Does the law have negative instances? Yes Yes
Does the law have positive instances? Yes No
Can the antecedent clause be completed
with material conditions? No Yes
Is the law concretizable
(i.e. piecemeal improvable)? No Yes
Does the law predict the cases
when it fails? No Yes
Examples of physical laws that fall into the category of ‘ideal law’ include: New-
ton’s laws of gravity andmotion, Coulomb’s law, Snell’s law of refractive index, Ohm’s
law, Maxwell’s equations, Galileo’s law of freefall, Hooke’s law, the law of thermal ex-
pansion and the Ideal Gas law. I suspect numerous other examples could be added
to this list.4
I am not the first to propose that the laws of physics and their alleged exceptions
are unlike those found in other sciences. John Earman and John Roberts have argued:
In general the problem of ceteris paribus qualifications is distinct from the
problem of idealizations. Often the idealization can be stated in a precise
closed form, (e.g. the ideal gas law. . . ). Here the problem is not in saying
precisely what is involved in the idealization but in relating it to the world
which is not ideal. By contrast, many cp laws claim to be about unideal-
ized real world situations but make indefinite claims about these situations.
(Earman and Roberts 1999, p.457)
The question that needs answering is whether exceptions pose more or less of
a threat to ideal laws than they do to traditional ceteris paribus laws? According to
Earman, Roberts and Smith (2002), physicists should not be so worried, as there is no
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real ‘problem of provisos’ for these laws analogous to Lange’s Dilemma. There is only
the appearance of a problem if one conflates the basic laws of physical theory with
differential equations governing the evolution of a specific type of physical system.
Cartwright is one of many philosophers, they claim, who makes this mistake. Their





Cartwright tells us this law ‘lies’ because it fails to represent the behaviour of
physical systems that involve forces other than gravity. But according to Earman,
Roberts and Smith:
UG cannot misrepresent the motion of body, because it says nothing specific
about such temporal behaviour. Only differential equations of evolution type
— which might be derivable from UG together with other considerations —
can be integrated to describe the temporal motion of a body or system of
bodies. UG cannot be so integrated. Thus, it cannot misrepresent temporal
motion. (2002, p.286)
Their point is that Newton’s law of universal gravity is a special force law. It does
not tell us anything about motion or behaviour in the sense these terms are ordinarily
understood, hence it cannot ‘lie’ nor have exceptions in the way Cartwright believes.
It might appear that it can if one confuses the law itself with the application of the
law to a type of physical system. This kind of application requires the creation of a
differential equation whose integration with other laws (such as Newton’s laws of
motion) depends first upon making non-nomic assumptions about what is present in
the system in question. Kepler’s laws approximate a differential equation for Newton’s
law because they assume only two gravitationally bound bodies. Earman, Roberts and
Smith conclude that such equations — whilst commonly referred to as ‘laws’ — are
not really genuine laws of nature.
If the differential equations are not laws, then what about the simple theoretical
laws from which they are derived? Smith believes these are the physical equations
that really should be given the title ‘law’. It is true that these are not about behaviour
ordinarily understood, but Smith believes this is an erroneous assumption made by
philosophers and should be abandoned:
All of this ought to be sufficient evidence to reject the standard presumption
of empiricists following Hume that laws express constant conjunctions of
temporally contiguous events. Laws like Universal Gravitation say nothing
about temporal successions by themselves. When we do have a differential
equation that does tell us something about temporal behaviour, it is generally
not a law because it is derived from laws and non-law ingredients. (2002,
p.249)
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Smith himself does not propose an alternative anti-Humean theory, although he
does suggest something like component forces will need to be taken as the primi-
tive subject matter for laws (2002, p.252). He therefore poses a new dilemma for
Humeans which we might call ‘Smith’s Dilemma’: either take the fundamental equa-
tions of physical theory (such as UG) as laws or take all the differential equations that
can be derived from them as laws. Both of these options appear unacceptable. If the
Humean takes the fundamental equations as laws they will need to acknowledge the
existence of component forces which goes beyond regularity. On the other hand, if
they take the differential equations to be laws (which are about occurrent behaviour)
then there will be as many different laws as there are physical systems— one for each
imaginable! One assumes that the second horn of this dilemma is unacceptable be-
cause scientific practice does not consider all these equations laws — rather, the laws
of nature form a very special and limited set. Smith acknowledges that it is true that
many differential equations are commonly referred to as ‘laws’ (Kepler’s laws being
a case in point) but puts this down to nothing more than a historical accident that
‘should not be taken seriously’ (2002, p.247).
If Humeans are to find a solution to Smith’s Dilemma it would appear that their
only option is to take some of the differential equations as laws. To do this requires
finding a principled way of separating the differential equations which are laws from
those which are not. Smith presupposes that no such principled means can be given:
but this isn’t true. As he himself remarks, there is something very different about
the differential equations which are commonly referred to as ‘laws’ — they are rules
which allow us to construct ‘minimally working models’ (2002, p.254). The two-
body system in which there are no other forces is the minimally working model for
UG (indeed it is this model that Cartwright takes UG to be ‘about’). The reason why
this model is minimal is that it makes the fewest number of assumptions possible
in order for the mathematical relationship to be realised. For each such differential
equation we can assign a set of ‘minimal assumptions’ which need to be present for
the law to obtain. The discovery of these minimal assumptions seems to be a crucial
part of scientific practice, something which Smith has perhaps overlooked. A Humean
solution to Smith’s Dilemma for physical laws should therefore start with a theory
that favours these minimal equations.
4. Ideal Laws as Lossy Compression Algorithms
One potential theory is the ‘Algorithmic Theory of Laws’ which has been advocated in
a number of different forms by Richard Feynman (1965), Murray Gell-Mann (1987),
John Barrow (1991), Paul Davies (1995), Gregory Chaitin (2005), Seth Lloyd (2006)
and Terence Tomkow (2013).5 Put simply, the algorithmic theory of laws claims that
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the laws of nature are the algorithms (or algorithmic component) in the best pos-
sible compression of nature. Although contemporary versions of this view appeal to
ideas from computer science and information theory, the basic thought behind it goes
back much further. In Ernst Mach (1838-1916) we see the idea expressed in terms of
‘economy of thought’ where the scientific enterprise is compared to a kind of business
that wants to maximize profit using as few resources as possible:
The communication of scientific knowledge always involves description, that
is, a mimetic reproduction of facts in thought, the object of which is to re-
place and save the trouble of new experience. Again, to save the labor of
instruction and of acquisition, concise, abridged description is sought. This
is really all the natural laws are. Knowing the value of the acceleration of
gravity, and Galileo’s laws of descent, we possess simple and compendious
directions for reproducing in thought all possible motions of falling bodies.
(1894[1943], p.193)
Although Mach himself talks about lawhood in terms of the scientific laws, we
can abstract somewhat, and arrive at a theory of what the laws of nature are by
themselves. This can be illustrated with the help of the following example. Consider
two sequences of symbols (A) and (B):
(A) 01101001100101101001011001101001 . . .
(B) 01011010111001010101111101001000 . . .
At first glance both appear to be equally random and contain the same amount
of information in terms of number of bits. However, the string represented by (A) is
an instance of a well-known sequence in mathematics (the ’Thue-Morse’ sequence)
and can be generated by following just two rules:
(Rule-1) If ‘0’ print ‘01’
(Rule-2) If ‘1’ print ‘10’
By themselves these two rules cannot produce anything, one also needs start-
ing conditions in the form of singular data. In this instance that corresponds to the
printing of ‘0’ once. It should quickly become apparent that no matter how long the
original sequence in (A) is, it is always reproducible printing ‘0’ plus the two rules
above. The length simply being a matter of how many times Rules-1 and 2 are ap-
plied. Unlike (B), string (A) is therefore highly compressible and can be compressed
to data that contains two distinct parts: (i) unstructured singular data, i.e. ‘0’, and (ii)
structured rules or algorithms, i.e. ‘Rules-1 and 2’. What makes compression possible
is the existence of statistical regularities in the original data: these are summarized
by the algorithm which exploit it for compression gains.
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Now on the assumption that our world is a regular place, it too ought to be algo-
rithmically compressible. If it is, then the laws of nature correspond to the algorithms
in its best compression. This comment requires some qualification because the world
is normally thought to bemade up of physical objects and processes and ‘compression’
is typically an operation on symbols or data. Scientists make observations about the
goings on in the world and take recordings. These recordings or measurements form
a body of data. From the standpoint of the algorithmic theory, it is this data which
scientists aim to compress and uncover the laws. But of course this data is only a
‘snapshot’ of all possible data that could have been recorded. The algorithmic theory
therefore abstracts from the actual recording to include all possible recordings (in
the entire history of the universe). If nature is understood as a source of information
and all possible recordings its data, then we can define the laws as follows:
The Algorithmic Theory of Laws: x is a law of nature if, and only if, x is an algorithm
and x is a member of d∗(w)
Where d∗(w) is the shortest possible description of w— the total data in our universe.
The existence of such a shortest possible description is guaranteed by algorithmic
information theory (Li and Vitanyi 2003). Hence the laws of nature are the algorithms
which when added to singular data form the best possible compression of ‘nature’s
information’.
The algorithmic theory is compatible with both a Humean and non-Humean
metaphysics; but it is far more likely to be appealing to Humeans because lawhood
supervenes on patterns (regularities) in the data and does not require the data being
about anything like necessary connections, essences or capacities. The Humean can
simply fill-in what the data is about with their preferred ontology, i.e. such as Lewisian
occurrent properties at space-time points. The algorithmic theory does not demand
that the data be about observable entities and processes either: indeed, if data can
be about unobservables as modern science take it to be, then the laws of nature in
the final ‘best compression’ will also be about unobservables. What one considers
to be the data that is compressed therefore depends on one’s metaphysics. What is
important, however, is that it is not necessary for there to be necessary connections,
essences or capacities in this data, in order for there to be laws of nature.
Before looking at how this theory copes with exceptions to laws, a few remarks
are worth making. Firstly, on this view lawhood is a contingent matter. Whether or
not there are laws at a world depends on whether that world is compressible. Hence
whilst Kepler’s laws, for example, do a good job of compressing recordings of plane-
tary motion in our world, they might not be the algorithms in the best compression
of some distant possible world where the behavior of planets is very different from
ours. Another point worth remarking is that on this view lawhood remains objective:
for a given body of data it is an objective fact whether it is compressible and what
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its best compression is. At this point it might be argued that since data requires a lin-
guistic representation and since this is a choice ‘made by us’, what counts as the best
compression is also a choice ‘made by us’. This criticism is analogous in form to that
made by Armstrong (1983, p.68) and van Fraassen (1989, p.53) against Lewis’ orig-
inal version of the BSA. I have argued elsewhere that thinking about laws in terms of
compression provides a solution to this problem that is unavailable to the standard
BSA. I therefore refer the interested reader to (Wheeler, 2016) rather than repeat
those arguments here.
How does thinking about laws as algorithms help the Humean accommodate ex-
ceptions, and in particular, exceptions to the laws in physics? David Braddon-Mitchell
has previously argued (2001) that Humean laws might tolerate exceptions if we
utilise a distinction, commonplace in computer science, between lossless and lossy
data compression. The key difference concerns whether information is lost during
the compression process. An algorithm is said to be lossless if, after the original data
has been compressed, the data can be decompressed to its original form without any
loss of information. By contrast, an algorithm is said to be lossy if, after compres-
sion and decompression, part of the original message is lost. Modern compression
methods typically use both lossy and lossless techniques depending on how much
information loss can be tolerated. For example, methods designed for text files are
lossless. This is because natural language cannot tolerate much degradation without
rendering the message meaningless. On the other hand, most image and audio files
are compressed using lossy compressors. This is because the human audio-visual sys-
tem can only make tone and chromatic distinctions up to a degree and typical record-
ing techniques often supply quality of data far in excess of this. These files, therefore,
can be compressed in a lossy fashion without much noticeable degradation.
Braddon-Mitchell’s proposal was to accommodate laws with exceptions by sup-
plementing Lewis’ BSA with this distinction:
What if we could keep the same level of simplicity and strength, but get closer
to a different truth-related desideratum — the whole truth — at the cost of
violating nothing but the truth clause. Or else dramatically increase the level
of simplicity and strength, at the cost of some violation of the nothing but the
truth clause? This would be analogous to lossy data compression. We might
trade off amount of truth and simplicity against complete accuracy. In data
compression terms, we might trade off compression ratio and completeness
(or extensiveness within a domain in which the algorithm is appropriate)
with accuracy. (2001, p.266)
Instead of the best system being a balance of only strength and simplicity — why
not allow accuracy to also be part of the mix? On some occasions, if sacrificing truth
delivers significant gains in simplicity, then shouldn’t this be preferred to a perfectly
accurate system that is nonetheless long and complex?
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Despite Braddon-Mitchell originally intending his explanation to go with the BSA,
I think it forms a more natural supplement to the Algorithmic Theory of Laws. Recall
that the BSA assumes laws are axioms (that is, statements) but in computer science
compression is normally thought to be achieved by a program which is a kind of rule
or algorithm. It is therefore more coherent to assume that if laws are doing com-
pressing then they are algorithms rather than statements of fact. Returning to Mach’s
point of science being like a business, it seems reasonable that on occasion scientists
would perform a ‘cost-benefit analysis’ and trade off some accuracy if the gains in re-
sources saved (i.e. simplicity) are great enough. Since on the algorithmic approach it
is compression which is the overriding factor for lawhood, laws which sacrifice accu-
racy for compression can be laws — and powerful laws — despite having exceptions.
The Humean can then explain why some laws-despite having exceptions — are still
genuine laws of nature.
A strong analogy exists between idealization in science and lossy data compres-
sion which provides further support for this account. During the design of an algo-
rithm for compression, if a programmer is aiming for a lossy compression, then their
methodwill typically involve a data preparation stage where the values of each datum
are first transformed, so that the overall data set exhibits more regularity or structure
than it originally did (Salomon 2008, p.50). This ‘structure-adding stage’ is needed
for lossy compression to be possible and once carried out is often irreversible. But
this kind of data-processing is a feature of scientific representation more generally
(McAllister 2003). Drawing a line of best-fit on a graph and working out the equation
for that line is just one simple illustration of this.
Because the structure-adding stage leads to a modification of the original values,
this has consequences for what is returned by the lossy algorithm if used to decom-
press (i.e. to return the original message). When there are perceptible differences
between the original and decompressed files, the differences are called ‘compression
artefacts’. One of the most striking examples of compression artefacts comes about
through the use of the JPEG compression algorithm. The reason this compressor has
proven so popular is the fact it gives the user the ability to define the level of com-
pression achieved. Images tree1.jpg and tree2.jpg show the output of JPEG for the
same image although with different factors of compression:
The image in ‘tree1.jpg’ has been compressed to 50% of the original whereas
‘tree2.jpg’ has been compressed to only 5% of the original. Clearly the greater the
compression we choose for our image the less it will resemble the original. It could
be argued that an analogous situation occurs when an ideal law is used to construct a
working model in science. Suppose I set up a pendulum in the laboratory and record
values for its mass and length. If I then plug these values back into a model and, by
measuring the time-period, use my model to calculate a value for g (the force due to
gravity) I shouldn’t be surprised if the value returned fails to match the real value at
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(a) tree1.jpg (b) tree2.jpg
this position. This is because the model contains a number of ‘idealization artefacts’
— such as point-masses, perfectly rigid rods and frictionless pivots. Just as I should
expect from using JPEG that my image of the tree will fail to resemble in all respects
the real-world tree, so too should I expect that any derivations made from using the
ideal model will fail to match the real-world exactly.6
The strong analogy that exists between the design and application of lossy com-
pressors, and the discovery and use of ideal laws to construct models, shows that
much can be gained by thinking of laws as algorithms for compressing empirical
data. I now turn to show how this equips the Humean with a solution to Smith’s
Dilemma.
5. Resolving Smith’s Dilemma
In section 3 we saw that Smith introduced a new dilemma for Humeans who wish
to construe the fundamental laws of physics as genuine laws of nature. Taking UG as
our example, Smith argued that this law cannot be interpreted as a regularity since,
by itself, UG does not describe any temporal behaviour. Instead, Smith believes, UG is
really about a component force— namely, the force due to gravity. This is unappealing
for Humeans as component forces seem to equate to Hume’s ‘secret powers’ and are
not directly measurable. It is possible, Smith goes on, to turn UG into a statement
about temporal behaviour by transforming it into a differential equation. However, in
the process of doing this we need to make certain non-nomic assumptions about the
type of physical system described, and so, the resulting equation will lack universal
application. This option is problematic as there appears to be no principled way of
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choosing one type of differential equation over any other and so we end up with too
many objects that can be classified as a ‘law’.
The Algorithmic Theory of Laws combined with the lossy/lossless compression
distinction provides the Humean with a principled way of favouring one of these
equations. For each set of differential equations (that describe a particular type of
physical phenomenon) there will be one which provides the rules for constructing a
‘minimal working model’. In line with Mach’s view of science as a ‘profitable busi-
ness’, the minimal equation will always be the preferred choice of scientists, since it
provides a description of the physical phenomenon in question using as few compu-
tational resources as possible. In reality, scientists will be willing to forgo accuracy if
the gains in compression are high enough. Just by analogy with the JPEG, if a certain
number of compression artefacts can be tolerated, then it is rational to prefer a lossy
compression.
At this point one might want to raise a problem for this explanation. Although
it provides the scientist with criteria to select the ideal law, it does not explain why
similar equations designed for more complex tokens of the phenomenon are not also
considered laws, given that they too provide accurate compressed description. What
grounds can be given, for instance, for favouring one lossy compression that achieves
50% compression over one that provides 35%?
I think in this case the Humean should accept that both equations are ‘lawlike’
(and so share many of the typical features philosophers associate with laws). But
we should make a distinction between the ‘laws for X ’ and the ‘laws of X ’. Many
algorithms can be laws for compressing a physical phenomenon, but only one of
these will be the best one. We can argue that part of the search for laws is then the
search for the best possible compression algorithm (lossless or lossy) that allows us
to use that law for explanation and prediction with a reasonable chance of success.
Of course, what counts as a ‘reasonable chance of success’ depends on what the law is
to be used for. UG might be very well and good for successfully predicting the orbit of
the Moon, but it will not be the preferred choice for predicting the motion of planets
subject to significant relativistic effects, such as that of Mercury.
On this point it might be further objected that the mere fact there is choice con-
cerning the lossiness of the compressionmeans introducing an element of subjectivity
into ideal laws. On a lossless reading of the algorithmic theory there is no subjectivity
problem — given any empirical data set we identify the law with the algorithm in
the best possible algorithmic compression of that data. But with lossy compression we
know we can choose the factor of compression, provided we are willing to sacrifice
some quality of information. The analogy with the JPEG compressor brings this point
home even more. The reason why the JPEG compressor is able to achieve impressive
compression gains is because it exploits a unique fact about human perception —
that our eyes are far more sensitive to contrast differences than they are to colour
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differences. Yet this is an idiosyncratic fact about human perception and shows that
whilst a JPEG compression factor of about 20% is perfectly acceptable for humans,
this might not be the case for other animals, whose eyes cannot tolerate these kinds
of chromatic artefacts.
If correct, this would seem to imply that the ‘ideal laws’ are really the laws that
are ‘ideal for humans’. As such there is no objective ‘Ideal Gas law’ only ‘the law that is
Ideal for what Humans want to do with Gases’. Compression factors are determined
by use which in our case is determined by human interests.
In spite of this, there is one sense in which the fidelity-loss tolerated by JPEG
is unlike that of empirical laws. The fact human eyes have more sensitive rod and
less sensitive cone photoreceptor cells is a psychological and internal fact about hu-
mans. In this case it is not possible for any further quality to be appreciated and so
on a practical level the extra information is redundant. Now compare the case with
scientific laws. Given the value of the temperature and volume of a gas we can cal-
culate its pressure. Again there is a choice. We could use the Ideal Gas law (which
is computationally cheap), or we could use the van der Waal’s equation (which is
computationally more expensive). But this time it is a pragmatic external fact that
determines whether the additional quality provided would be redundant or not. For
example, if we are calculating the pressure of a gas on the surface of the Sun, then
clearly we should opt for the Ideal Gas law. Whereas if we are calculating the pres-
sure of a gas in deep space, then clearly we should opt for van der Waal’s equation
(since at low temperatures inter-molecular forces have greater significance). In these
kinds of cases there is a sense in which the amount of information loss that can be
tolerated depends on external facts about the environment that the phenomenon is
in and so is not wholly determined by human interests.
This is the best explanation Humeans have for explaining why some fundamental
physical laws, despite having exceptions, can be genuinely lawlike. I admit some will
feel the connection between ideal laws and human interests is too close. Yet I fail to
see how else they can explain the existence of these laws without straying beyond
regularity and a broadly Humean metaphysics.
References
Armstrong, D. 1983. What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Braddon-Mitchell, D. 2001. Lossy Laws. Noûs 35(2): 260–277.
Callender, C.; Cohen, J. 2010. Special Sciences, Conspiracy and the Better Best System Ac-
count of Lawhood. Erkenntnis 73(3): 427–447.
Cartwright, N. 1983. How the Laws of Physics Lie. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
———. 1989. Nature’s Capacities and Their Measurement. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
———. 1999. The Dappled World. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Principia 21(3): 317–337 (2017).
Humeanism and Exceptions in the Fundamental Laws of Physics 335
Cohen, J.; Callender, C. 2009. A Better Best System Account of Lawhood. Philosophical Studies
145(1): 1–34.
Davies, P. 1995. Algorithmic Compressibility, Fundamental and Phenomenological Laws. In:
F. Weinert (ed.) Laws of Nature: Essays on the Philosophical, Scientific and Historical Di-
mensions, pp.248–267. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter & Co.
Dorato, M. 2005a. The Laws of Nature and the Effectiveness of Mathematics. In: G. Boniolo
(ed.) The Role of Mathematics in Physical Sciences, pp.131–144. Amsterdam: Springer.
———. 2005b. The Software of the Universe. Aldershot: Ashgate.
Earman, J.; Roberts, J. 1999. Ceteris Paribus, There is No Problem of Provisos. Synthese 118:
439–478.
Earman, J.; Roberts, J.; Smith, S. 2002. Ceteris Paribus Lost. In: J. Earman; C. Glymour; S.
Mitchell (eds.) Ceteris Paribus Laws, pp.5–25. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
Feynman, R. 1965. The Character of Physical Law. London: BBC.
Fodor, J. 1991. You can Fool Some of The People All of The Time, Everything Else being Equal:
Hedged Laws and Psychological Explanations. Mind 100(1): 19–34.
Galileo, G. 1638[1954]. Dialogues Concerning Two New Sciences. Translated by H. Crew and
A. de Silvio. New York: Dover.
Gell-Mann, M. 1987. Simplicity and Complexity in the Description of Nature. (M. Gell-Mann,
Performer, October 1). California Institute of Technology: Pasadena.
Hausman, D. 1992. The Inexact and Seperate Science of Economics. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Huttemann, A. 2007. Causation, Laws and Dispositions. In: M. Kistler; B. Gnassounou (eds.)
Dispositions and Causal Powers, pp.207–219. Aldershot: Ashgate.
———. 2014. Ceteris Paribus Laws in Physics. Erkenntnis 78(10): 1715–1728.
Kowalenko, R. 2011. The Epistemology of Hedged Laws. Studies in History and Philosophy of
Science 42: 445–452.
Lange, M. 1993. Natural Laws and the Problem of Provisos. Erkenntnis 38: 233–248.
Laymon, R. 1989. Cartwright and the Lying Laws of Physics. The Journal of Philosophy 86(7):
353–372.
Lewis, D. 1973. Counterfactuals. Oxford: Blackwell.
———. 1980. A Subjectivist’s Guide to Objective Chance. The University of Western Ontario
Series in Philosophy of Science 15: 267–297.
———. 1986. Causation. In: D. Lewis, Philosophical Papers, Volume II, pp.159–213. Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
Li, M.; Vintanyi, P. 1993. An Introduction to Kolmogorov Complexity and its Applications. New
York: Springer-Verlag.
Mach, E. 1894[1943]. Popular Scientific Lectures. Illinois: Open Court.
McAllister, J. 2003. Algorithmic Randomness in Empirical Data. Studies in the History and
Philosophy of Science 34: 633–646.
———. 2005. Algorithmic Compression of Empirical Data: Reply to Twardy, Gardner and
Dowe. Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science 36: 403–410.
Mill, J. S. 1895[1974]. A System of Logic. London: Routledge Kegan and Paul.
Mumford, S. 1998. Dispositions. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Nelson, R. A.; Olsson, M. G. 1986. The pendulum-Rich physics from a simple system. Ameri-
can Journal of Physics 54(2): 112–121.
Principia 21(3): 317–337 (2017).
336 Billy Wheeler
Nowak, L. 1980. The Structure of Idealization. Dordrecht: Reidel.
Pietroski, P.; Rey, G. 1995. When Other Things Aren’t Equal: Saving Ceteris Paribus Laws from
Vacuity. The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 46(1): 81–110.
Ramsey, F. 1990. Philosophical Papers. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Saloman, D. 2008. A Concise Introduction to Data Compression. London: Springer-Verlag.
Schrenk, M. 2007. The Metaphysics of Ceteris Paribus Laws. Lancaster: Verlag.
———. 2014. Better Best Systems and the Issue of CP-Laws. Erkenntnis 79(S10): 1787–1799.
Schurz, G. 2001. Pietroski and Rey on Ceteris Paribus Laws. British Journal for the Philosophy
of Science 52: 359–370.
Silverberg, A. 1996. Psychological Laws and Non-Monotonic Logic. Erkenntnis 44: 199–224.
Smith, S. 2002. Violated Laws, Ceteris Paribus Clauses, and Capacities. Synthese 130: 235–
264.
Sober, E. 1984. The Nature of Selection. London: The MIT Press.
Suarez, M. 2009. Fictions in Science. New York: Routledge.
Twardy, C.; Gardner, S.; Dowe, D. 2005. Empirical Data Sets are Algorithmically Compress-
ible: Reply to McAllister? Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science 36: 391–402.
van Fraassen, B. 1989. Laws and Symmetry. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Wheeler, B. 2016. Simplicity, Language-Dependency and the Best System Account of Laws.
Theoria: An International Journal for the Theory, History and Foundations of Science 31:
189–206.
Woodward, J. 2002. There is No Such Thing as a Ceteris Paribus Law. Erkenntnis 57: 303–328.
BILLY WHEELER
Sun Yat-sen University
Department of Philosophy (Zhuhai)
wheeler@mail.sisu.edu.cn
RECEIVED: 09/07/2017 ACCEPTED: 21/11/2017
Notes
1For a critical discussion of semantic solutions see Earman and Roberts (1999), Schurz
(2001) and Woodward (2002).
2Lewis’ final theory is bit more complicated than this in that he allows for the possibility
that some systems might be ‘tied’ for best balance. To accommodate probabilistic laws, Lewis
also adds a third desired feature which he calls ‘fit’, so that laws are the axioms in a system
best balancing simplicity, strength and closeness to the actual world history. For further details,
see Lewis (1994).
3This part of Schrenk’s version of the BSA is also adopted by Callender and Cohen (2009;
2010).
4I treat it here as an empirical/historical fact that most ideal laws are to be found in the
physical sciences and ceteris paribus laws in the special sciences. I see no analytical reason
for thinking things could not be vice-versa. In addition, there are grounds for thinking that
Darwin’s law of natural selection is best classified as an ideal law as its idealization conditions
are clearly statable (Sober 1984, p.38).
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5Algorithmic approaches have also been discussed by Mauro Dorato (2005a; 2005b) and
James McAllister (2003). See McAllister (2003; 2005) for criticism of the view and Twardy,
Gardner and Dowe (2005) for a defence.
6The account offered here therefore also provides a novel explanation for the existence
of ‘fictions’ in scientific theories. See Mauricio Suarez (2009) for the context to the wider
debate on the function of fictions in science.
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